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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-
2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the First 
Cause of Action asserted in Plaintiffs1 Complaint. On appeal 
from the entry of summary judgment, the only determinations 
required are "whether the trial court erred in applying the 
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that 
there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. 
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
This is an action for damages in which Plaintiffs Leon W. 
Robinson and Arlene Robinson (the "Robinsons") have asserted 
causes of action alleging fraud, conversion and fraudulent 
conveyance. The Complaint commencing this action was filed on 
May 15, 1992. Defendants filed their Answer and Third Party 
Complaint on May 29, 1992. 
On February 12, 1993, the Robinsons filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and supporting memorandum of points and 
authorities. Defendants filed their Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on February 24, 1993, and the Robinsons filed 
their Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on March 8, 
1993. 
A hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was 
held before the trial court on April 16, 1993. On April 29, 
1993, the trial court entered its Order Granting Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. On that same date, the trial court 
entered Judgment against Defendants Kerry Rick Hubble 
(hereinafter "Hubble") and Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. 
(hereinafter "WBS"), jointly and severally, in the principal 
amount of $24,780.56. 
Defendants Hubble and WBS timely filed their Notice of 
Appeal on May 5, 1993. 
B, Statement of Facts 
1. Approximately four years prior to the commencement of 
the case at bar, on February 22, 1988, an Amended Judgment was 
entered in favor of the Robinsons and against Hubble in Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, case number C-87-3023. The total principal amount of the 
Judgment was $27,280.56. (R. 164). 
2. At the time of the entry of the Amended Judgment, Hubble 
was the record owner of certain real property located in Summit 
County, Utah, more particularly described as: Lot 63, Summit Park 
Plat "J" (Lot 63) (hereinafter referred to as the "Summit County 
Property"). (R. 003, paragraph 8; and R. 014, paragraph 9). 
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3. On March 4, 1988, the Robinsons properly filed and 
recorded a transcript of the Amended Judgment with the Clerk of 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State 
of Utah. (R. 105). Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-22-1, 
the Amended Judgment became a lien on the Summit County Property. 
4. On or about December 24, 1991, Hubble entered into an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (the "First Earnest Money 
Agreement") with one Glen Hanson pursuant to which Hubble agreed 
to sell the Summit County Property to Hanson for the purchase 
price of $60,000.00. (R. 106). 
5. Sometime between Hubblefs execution of the First Earnest 
Money Agreement on December 24, 1991, and January 27, 1992, 
Hubble discovered the Robinsons' judgment lien. (R. 109, lines 2-
23). 
6. On or about January 27, 1992, a Complaint purporting to 
be filed on behalf of Defendant Kay Gneiting ("Gneiting"), as 
plaintiff, was filed in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Summit County, State of Utah, civil no. 92-11322 (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Foreclosure Action"), in which the named 
Defendants were Hubble, the Robinsons, and a person claiming an 
equitable lien on the Summit County Property by the name of Jim 
Quinn. (R. 120). Gneiting was an employee of WBS. Hubble is 
the General Manager and a shareholder of WBS. (R. 118, lines 24-
25; and R. 013, paragraph 4). 
7. Attached as an Exhibit to the Complaint in the 
Foreclosure Action was a "Mortgage" which had been filed of 
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record in the Summit County Recorder's Office on November 13, 
1987, and in which Gneiting, as Mortgagor, purports to grant 
Hubble, as Mortgagee, a mortgage on the Summit County Property in 
the amount of $37,000.00 payable as follows: 
Quarterly interest payments in the amount of $370.00 
commencing November 15, 1987 ... The total unpaid principal 
balance together with accrued interest will be due in full 
on or before August 15, 1989. 
(R. 126). 
8. In the First Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action, 
Gneiting asserted a claim for "Reformation", alleging the 
existence of the above referenced Mortgage, and further alleging 
that: 
Neither [Gneiting] nor [Hubble] were represented by counsel 
or a title company and the mortgage is prepared incorrectly. 
Kerry R. Hubble should show as the mortgagor and the person 
obligated to make payment and Kay Gneiting should show as the 
mortgagee to whom money is owed. 
(R. 122, paragraph 11)(emphasis added). 
9. In the Second Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action, 
Gneiting asserted a claim for "Mortgage Foreclosure", alleging 
the existence of the Mortgage, that Gneiting should be the 
Mortgagee and Hubble the Mortgagor, and that: 
The Defendant Hubble has failed to make payment of the 
$37,000.00, together with interest at the pre-judgment rate 
of 10% per annum, and there is now due and owing ... the sum 
of $53,421.92. 
(R. 122, paragraph 14). 
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10. In the Third Cause of Action in the Foreclosure Action, 
Gneiting asserted a claim for "Quiet Title", alleging that: 
All of the right title and interest of [Gneiting] to the 
[Summit County Property] is superior to the claim of all 
other parties Defendant [including the Robinsons]... 
(R. 123, paragraph 21). 
11. In his deposition taken in the case at bar on December 2, 1992, 
Gneiting testified that all of the material allegations asserted in the Foreclosure 
Action Complaint were false. Specifically, Gneiting testified that: 
a. the Mortgage was prepared to memorialize an 
agreement between Gneiting and Hubble whereby Gneiting (not 
Hubble) was going to purchase the property for the sum of 
$37,000.00. (R. 110, lines 15-19). 
b. However, Gneiting was never able to make the 
payments called for under the Mortgage and, therefore, Gneiting 
had lost any interest he might have had in the Summit County 
Property prior to 1990 when he filed for relief in bankruptcy 
court and failed to list the Summit County Property on his 
bankruptcy schedules. (R. 117, lines 19-25; R. 115, line 17 
through R. 116, line 8). 
c. Hubble never owed Gneiting $37,000.00 as alleged in 
the Complaint. Further, Gneiting never told the attorney who 
filed the Foreclosure Action that Hubble owed him any money. (R. 
Ill, lines 9-10; R. 112, line 23 through R. 113, line 2). The 
only money that Hubble ever owed Gneiting in connection with the 
Summit County Property was the $2,000.00 Gneiting was paid by 
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Hubble and/or WBS to go along with Hubblefs scheme to defraud the 
Robinsons. (R. Ill, lines 12-25; R. 113, lines 15-18; R. 114, 
lines 17-21; R. 118, line 2 through R. 119, line 25). 
12. After filing the Foreclosure Action, Gneitingfs counsel 
contacted the Robinsons, falsely represented to them that 
Gneitingfs interest in the property was superior to theirs, and 
offered to pay the Robinsons $2,500.00 to release their judgment 
lien against the Summit County Property. In reliance upon 
Gneiting?s counsel's misrepresentation, the Robinsons released 
their judgment lien. (R. 127-133). 
13. Notwithstanding the fact that Gneiting had no interest 
in the Summit County Property and the fact that Hubble never owed 
Gneiting any money with respect to the property, Gneiting 
obtained the District Court's Judgment And Order reforming the 
subject Mortgage "to substitute the Plaintiff, Kay Gneiting, as 
the mortgagee and Kerry R. Hubble as the mortgagor." (R. 135-
136). 
14. Gneiting also filed a second Stipulation And Settlement 
Agreement in the Foreclosure Action in which Hubble professed to 
stipulate that he would not contest the Foreclosure Action "and 
that a judgment and order of foreclosure may be entered against 
[Hubble] reforming the mortgage ... and allowing [Gneiting] to 
foreclose the mortgage ..." (R. 138-139). 
15. After fraudulently obtaining the District Court's 
Judgment And Order reforming the Mortgage and quieting title in 
Gneiting, a second Earnest Money Sales Agreement was prepared in 
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connection with the Summit County Property, this time identifying 
Gneiting as the owner/seller, but containing the same material 
terms as those contained in the First Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement which had identified Hubble as the owner/seller. (R. 
141). 
16. On or about March 3, 1992, Gneitingfs sale of the 
Summit County Property closed and a check (No. 3689) in the 
amount of $47,139.60 drawn on Park City Title Company's trust 
account was issued to Gneiting. (R. 143). Gneiting immediately 
purchased a cashier!s check made payable to WBS and handed the 
check over to Hubble. (R. 114, lines 17-21). In his deposition, 
Gneiting explained as follows: 
Q. What did you do with the cashier's check? 
A. Gave it to Wilderness Building Systems. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because it wasn't mine. 
• • • 
Q. So this $47,000 was never yours? 
A. No. 
(R. 114, line 17 through R. 115, line 5). Gneiting further 
testified that the reason he turned the sales proceeds over to 
WBS was that Hubble owned the property: 
Q. Is that correct, to your knowledge, that Mr. Hubble 
owned the property? 
A. Yes... 
Q. How did you know that? 
7 
A. Well, it was just why I turned the check over to them. 
(R. 118, lines 13-21). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. There is no genuine dispute with respect to the facts 
necessary to establish the Robinsons' fraud claim. 
In support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
Robinsons relied on the above referenced admissions contained in 
Gneiting's deposition testimony and upon certain documentary 
evidence the truth and accuracy of which were admitted by 
Defendants. The evidence presented clearly established the 
elements of the Robinsons' fraud claim. 
Defendants, however, failed to file affidavits or other 
materials in opposition to the Robinsons1 motion. Instead, they 
relied upon the allegations contained in their pleadings and upon 
select portions of Gneiting*s deposition testimony. 
As a matter of law, the allegations set forth in Defendants1 
pleadings were not sufficient to raise a factual issue, and the 
excerpts from Gneiting?s deposition testimony upon which 
Defendants rely do not raise any material issues of fact. 
B. The trial court correctly applied the governing law. 
In order to prevail on their fraud claim, the Robinsons were 
required to establish each of the nine elements set forth in 
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, 832 P.2d 62 (Utah App. 
1992). The undisputed facts of this case clearly and 
convincingly establish each of these nine elements. 
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C. The Robinsons' judgment lien rode through Hubblefs 
bankruptcy proceedings unaffected. 
Although HubbleTs personal liability to the Robinsons was 
extinguished by his bankruptcy filing, the Robinsons1 judgment 
lien rode through the bankruptcy proceedings unaffected. 
Accordingly, Hubblefs bankruptcy filing is irrelevant with 
respect to the question of the propriety of the entry of summary 
judgment in the case at bar. 
D. Defendants' "accord and satisfaction" and "estoppel" 
defenses do not create issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
The facts which form the basis for Defendants' "accord and 
satisfaction" and "estoppel" defenses are undisputed. The 
application of those defenses to the undisputed facts of this 
case was a matter of law. The trial court properly concluded 
that accord and satisfaction and estoppel were not valid defenses 
with respect to the Robinsons1 fraud claim. 
E. The trial court complied with Rule 52(a). 
The Robinsons1 motion for partial summary judgment was based 
on only one ground: their fraud claim. Accordingly, pursuant to 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., the trial court was not required to enter 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a brief written 
statement. 
ARGUMENT 
A. There is no genuine dispute with respect to the facts 
necessary to establish the Robinsons1 fraud claim. 
Defendants attempt to create an issue of fact by asserting 
that there is a question with respect to the ownership of the 
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Summit County Property at the time of the filing of the 
Foreclosure Action. Specifically, Defendants rely on paragraph 9 
of their Answer to the Robinsons! Complaint in which they admit 
that Hubble was the record owner of the property, but allege that 
"said lot was sold to Kevin Kay Gneiting in approximately August 
of 1987." (R. 014). 
Defendants1 reliance is misplaced. The allegations 
contained in their pleadings may not be relied upon by Defendants 
to create an issue of fact. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 
(Utah 1983). 
Defendants also rely on Gneitingfs deposition testimony to 
the effect that Gneiting and Hubble had entered into an agreement 
in or around 1987 whereby Gneiting was to purchase the Summit 
County Property from Hubble, first by making quarterly 
installment payments of $370.00 and later, after Gneiting was 
unable to afford the payments, by providing labor to Hubble. 
Defendants1 bad faith is transparent. In the Complaint 
filed in the Foreclosure Action, Gneiting alleged that "Kerry R. 
Hubble should show as the mortgagor and the person obligated to 
make payment and Kay Gneiting should show as the mortgagee to 
whom money is owed." (R. 122, paragraph 11). In other words, in 
the Foreclosure Action Gneiting alleged that it was Hubble who 
bought the property from him, not he who bought the property from 
Hubble. In order to establish his right to foreclosure, Gneiting 
further alleged that: 
"The Defendant Hubble has failed to make payment of the 
$37,000.00 [which he allegedly owed to Gneiting] ... 
i n 
and there is now due and owing ... the sum of 
$53,421.92. 
(R. 122, paragraph 14). 
In his deposition, however, Gneiting admitted that the 
allegations of the Complaint in the Foreclosure Action were lies; 
that Hubble never owed him any money and that he had lost any 
interest which he might have had in the property long before the 
Foreclosure Action was filed. (R. Ill, lines 9-10; R. 117, lines 
119-25). Gneiting also testified that the reason why he gave 
Hubble the $47,139.60 net proceeds from the sale of the property 
was because Hubble owned the property: 
Q. What did you do with the [$47,000] cashier's check? 
A. Gave it to Wilderness Building Systems. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because it wasn't mine. 
• • • 
Q. So this $47,000 was never yours? 
A. No. 
. . . 
Q. Is that correct to your knowledge, that Mr. Hubble owned 
the property? 
Q. How did you know that? 
A. Well, it was just why I turned the check over to them. 
(R. 114, line 17 through R. 115, line 5; and R. 118, lines 13-
21). 
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For Defendants to argue now that Gneiting's testimony 
supports their contention that there is an issue of fact with 
respect to the ownership of the property is preposterous and 
merely serves to demonstrate Defendants' repeated willingness to 
misrepresent the ownership of the property to suit their 
particular purpose at the time* Gneiting has admitted (and 
neither of the other Defendants has disputed) that he was unable 
to follow through on his agreement to purchase the property and 
that he had lost any interest he might have had in the property 
long before the filing of the Foreclosure Action. 
B. The trial court correctly applied the governing law. 
As demonstrated above, in December of 1991, Hubble was the 
record owner of the Summit County Property. When Hubble 
attempted to sell the property in December of 1991, however, he 
discovered that the Robinsons1 judgment lien encumbered the 
property to the tune of approximately $40,000.00. In order to 
avoid having to satisfy the Robinsons' judgment lien out of the 
sales proceeds, Hubble had his employee, Gneiting, file the 
Foreclosure Action fraudulently misrepresenting that Gneiting, 
not Hubble, was the mortgagee under a recorded Mortgage 
instrument; further fraudulently misrepresenting that Hubble owed 
Gneiting in excess of $53,000.00 under the Mortgage; and further 
fraudulently misrepresenting that Hubble had failed and refused 
to pay Gneiting the $53,000.00 plus owed to Gneiting. 
Based upon these admittedly false representations, Gneiting 
obtained the District Court's Judgment And Order reforming the 
1 O 
Mortgage to allow him to foreclose on the property, title to 
which was also quieted in Gneiting's name. Gneiting then sold 
the property for $60,000.00, receiving a check from Park City 
Title Company's trust account for the net sales proceeds in the 
sum of $47,139.60, with which he immediately purchased a cashier's check 
payable to WBS, which he then immediately turned over to Hubble. Hubble 
paid Gneiting $2,000.00 for his participation in Hubble?s scheme 
to defraud the Robinsons, or, as Gneiting described the plan: 
"I didn't sell [the Summit County Property]. What it 
was was the paperwork was made backwards. The [Summit 
County Property] was in my name to where the check was 
made out to me when it was sold." 
(R. 113, lines 16-18). 
The admitted and obvious purpose of Defendants' scheme was 
to avoid having to satisfy the Robinsons' judgment lien out of 
the proceeds from the sale of the Summit County Property by 
fraudulently misrepresenting Gneiting's interest in the property. 
Thus, the undisputed facts before the trial court clearly 
and convincingly established each of the nine elements of fraud 
set forth in Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, 832 P.2d 62, 66 
(Utah App. 1992): (1) Defendants represented that Gneiting was 
the owner of the Summit County Property; (2) Defendants' 
representation concerned a then presently existing material fact; 
(3) Defendants' representation was false; (4) Defendants knew 
their representation was false; (5) Defendants' misrepresentation 
was made for the purpose of inducing the Robinsons to execute the 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 127) and Partial 
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Releases of Judgment Liens (R. 130-132); (6) the Robinsons, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in 
fact rely upon Defendants1 misrepresentation; (8) in executing 
the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and the Partial Releases 
of Liens; (9) to their injury and damage. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly applied the law in 
granting the Robinsons' summary judgment with respect to their 
fraud claim. 
C. The Robinsons' judgment lien rode through Hubble?s 
bankruptcy proceedings unaffected. 
Before the trial court, Defendants argued that the 
Robinsons' judgment lien had been extinguished by Hubble?s 
bankruptcy. (R. 155). Defendants have apparently abandoned that 
argument and now contend that lf[i]n order for the Robinsons to 
properly pursue their judgment against Hubble and seek to have 
the dischargeability of said debt denied, it would have been 
necessary for them to file a complaint objecting to discharge in 
the bankruptcy proceeding itself, which was never done."1 
Defendants1 contention is without merit. 
It is well recognized that "liens pass through bankruptcy 
unaffected." Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773, 778 (1992); see also 
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 1829 (1991)("Ordinarily, 
liens and other secured interests survive bankruptcy"); and 
Johnson v. Home, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 2154 (1991)("... a bankruptcy 
discharge extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim --
^rief of Appellants - Kerry Rick Hubble and Wilderness 
Building Systems, Inc., at pp. 22-23. 
1 A 
namely, an action against the debtor in personam -- while leaving 
intact another -- namely, an action against the debtor in rem"). 
It was, therefore, not necessary for the Robinsons to file a 
non-dischargeability action in the bankruptcy court in order to 
preserve their judgment lien. 
D. Defendants' "accord and satisfaction" and "estoppel" 
defenses do not create issues of fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
Defendants' contention that their "accord and satisfaction" 
and "estoppel" defenses created an issue of fact precluding 
summary judgment is meritless. The facts upon which Defendants 
base their defenses are undisputed. The application of the 
doctrines of estoppel and accord and satisfaction to the 
undisputed facts is a matter of law. The trial court properly 
rejected Defendants' argument that estoppel and accord and 
satisfaction constitute valid defenses to the Robinsons' fraud 
claim. 
E. The trial court complied with Rule 52(a). 
Although not explicitly stated in their moving papers, the 
Robinsons' motion for partial summary judgment was based upon 
only one ground: the fraud claim set forth in the First Cause of 
Action alleged in the Complaint. (R. 102). No argument was made 
and no authority was cited which would have supported the entry 
of judgment on the Robinsons' conversion and fraudulent 
conveyance claims. The trial court understood that the Robinsons 
were seeking summary judgment only in connection with their fraud 
claim. (R. 342, lines 1 through 19). Likewise, Defendants 
15 
understood that the Robinsons were seeking summary judgment only 
in connection with their fraud claim. (R. 330, lines 20-24). 
Accordingly, because the Robinsons' motion was based upon 
only one ground, the trial court was not required to enter 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a brief written 
statement of the grounds for its decision. Rule 52(a), Utah R. 
Civ. P. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Robinsons respectfully request 
that the Judgment entered by the trial court be affirmed. 
DATED this /y^^day of March, 1994. / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing was 
mailed this /Q*1* day of March, 1994, via first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kent L. Christiansen, Esq. 
300 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84^11 
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Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 126 127 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J. 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v. 
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rei. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. 'Pfiomas, 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial <s=> 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
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ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Caption. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal contempt. 
EfTect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties. 
Judicial review. 
—Equity cases. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
" Findings of facts by jury. 
Intent. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
—Found insufficient. 
Vacation of judgment. 
—Found sufficient. 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
—Recitals of procedures. 
—Technical error. 
—Ultimate facts. 
Summary judgment. 
—Statement of grounds. 
Waiver. 
—Failure of court. 
When filed. 
—Tardy filing. 
Cited. 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
In a contract action by a real estate broker 
for his commission, where the defendant raises 
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his 
answer, the court should make findings on the 
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact on ail material issues 
is reversible error where it is prejudicial. 
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 
P.2d 284 (1954). 
—Advisory verdict. 
The trial court has the responsibility to 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury. 
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 
392 (Utah 1980). 
—Breach of contract. 
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of con-
tract, requested finding by court on material 
issue as to whether the foundation of their 
house had been located in accordance with zon-
ing ordinances and restrictive covenants, it 
was the duty of the court to make such a find-
ing. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 146 
set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue. Downey State Bank v. Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976). 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124,288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «s=> 92 to 134. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
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pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
rHearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
